Punishments Handed Out For Poor Judgement Throughout or Earlier than Niger Ambush that Killed Four Green Berets, Four Nigerien Troopers.
The Military has punished Green Beret workforce 3212 chief, Alpha Firm, 2nd Battalion, Capt. Mike Perozeni, and his second in command, an unidentified grasp sergeant, for his or her selections and for not offering enough coaching earlier than the Niger mission NYT reported, citing army officers.
To date, 4 officers and two enlisted troopers acquired letters of reprimand in accordance with the report.
Maj. Alan Van Saun, the corporate commander for Alpha Firm, was additionally reprimanded for improper coaching though he was on depart through the ambush.
Alpha Firm’s sergeant main, but to be recognized, who had left the unit earlier than Team 3212 deployed, was additionally reprimanded for lack of coaching and improper staffing.
Commanding Officer of SOF in Africa, Common Hicks was the very best officer reprimanded for not having enough oversight over the three missions by which the SOF forces have been concerned in Niger.
The senior officers who permitted the missions escaped punishment. The commander who oversaw Alpha Firm and Team 3212, Lt. Col. David Painter, and Col. Brad Moses, the commanding officer of Third Special Forces Group weren’t punished.
Ambush in Niger: Marine Corps Common Dunford Weighs In
“On the 3rd of October, 12 members of the U.S. Special Operations Task Force accompanied 30 Nigerien forces on a civil-military reconnaissance mission from the capital city of Niamey to an area near the village of Tongo Tongo,” he stated. The village is situated slightly over 50 miles north of Niamey, and officers anticipated the probabilities of assembly an enemy have been slight.
The subsequent day, Dunford stated, the forces started shifting again, once they have been attacked by roughly 50 enemy utilizing small-arms hearth, rocket-propelled grenades and technical automobiles.
“Approximately one hour after taking fire, the team requested support,” he stated. “And within minutes the remotely piloted aircraft arrived overhead. Within an hour, French Mirage jets arrived on station.”
Nonetheless later, French assault helicopters arrived on station, and a Niger quick-reaction pressure arrived.
In the course of the firefight, two U.S. troopers have been wounded and evacuated by French plane to Niamey, and that was in keeping with the casualty evacuation plan that was in place for this specific operation, Dunford stated, in accordance with the next report by DOD’s Jim Garamone
Three U.S. troopers who have been killed have been evacuated the night of Oct. four, Dunford stated.
“At that time, Sergeant La David Johnson was still missing,” the overall stated.
“On the evening of Oct. 6, Sergeant Johnson’s body was found and subsequently evacuated,” he stated. “From the time the firefight was initiated until Sergeant Johnson’s body was recovered, French, Nigerien or U.S. forces remained in that area.”
The questions that want solutions, he stated, embrace: Did the mission of U.S. forces change in the course of the operation? Did U.S. forces have satisfactory intelligence, gear and coaching? Was there a premission evaluation of the menace within the space correct? And, How did U.S. forces develop into separated in the course of the engagement, particularly Sergeant Johnson?
And, why didn’t they take time to seek out and get well Sergeant Johnson? Dunford stated.
“We owe the families of the fallen more information, and that’s what the investigation is designed to identify,” he stated.
The overall stated the marketing campaign towards violent extremists is making progress, however rather more must be completed.
Inquiries to be Answered
The fight was robust and confused, the chairman stated. There are extra questions that have to be answered, he added, and that is why U.S. Africa Command appointed a basic officer to research.
21 OCTOBER REPORT
New particulars are rising concerning the assault that left 4 U.S. troopers lifeless in Niger as U.S. congressional leaders are demanding solutions from the Pentagon. VOA report by Idrissa Fall and Bagassi Koura
The 4 U.S. service members, three of whom have been Green Berets (particular forces), together with 4 Nigerien troopers have been killed on October four in an ambush in Tongo-Tongo, a village close to the border with Mali.
On the eve of the assault, about 30 Special Forces, principally Nigeriens and eight U.S. Green Berets, set off in pickup vans towards the border village and arrived at night time, in line with Almou Hassane, mayor of Tongo-Tongo, within the Tondikiwindi district.
“They must have spent the night in the northwest of Tongo-Tongo,” Mayor Hassane stated in a telephone interview with the VOA French-to-Africa service.
“These Nigerien soldiers are part of a security and intelligence battalion that has been trained by the U.S. forces during several U.S.-led training exercises known as Flintlock,” stated Moussa Aksar, director of the newspaper l’Évènement in Niamey, and a terrorism specialist within the Sahel.
The troopers have been making an attempt to trace down an confederate of Abu Adnan al-Sahraoui, a former member of the Motion for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), who joined the Islamic State terror group within the Sahara Desert.
The troopers questioned the villagers, who dragged on the discussions longer than anticipated.
“It turns out that this village was a little contaminated by hostile forces,” stated Aksar. “The unit stayed a little longer than expected because apparently people were aware that something was going on.”
For his half, Mayor Hassane stated, “The attackers, the bandits, the terrorists have never lacked accomplices among local populations.”
A pretend terror assault attracted the troopers to a lure outdoors the village, the place about 50 assailants in automobiles and bikes armed with Kalashnikovs and heavy weapons opened hearth on them. Four Nigerien troopers and three People have been killed on the spot. The physique of the fourth American soldier was discovered 48 hours later, a few mile away from the preliminary website, CNN reported.
“We are not talking about civilians wounded or killed because these soldiers were ambushed outside the village,” Aksar stated.
The assault has raised questions, particularly because the U.S. Military operates drone bases in Niger and has vital intelligence assets there.
“That’s what really shocked us: how, at their level, with all the resources they have, they could not have strong intelligence to avoid what happened there,” stated Hassane.
Because the assault, Tongo-Tongo village chief Mounkaila Alassane has been arrested, and there’s no info on his whereabouts.
No group has formally taken duty for the assault. In line with sources within the area, nevertheless, it’s the work of Abu Adnan al-Saharaoui, who calls himself the Islamic Emir of the Nice Sahara, affiliated with the Islamic State group.
In line with a Tuareg from the area, al-Saharaoui is reported to be concerned in arms and gasoline trafficking. He’s a former member of the Motion for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), which occupied and imposed sharia regulation in northern Mali in 2012 earlier than being dislodged by French forces.
Al-Saharaoui, a former acquaintance of Algerian extremist and trafficker Mokhtar Bel Mokhtar, had led the kidnapping of the nine-person employees of the Algerian consulate in Gao in 2012. Initially from Western Sahara, he needs to regulate the band on the widespread border of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.
“He wants to take control of all these communities facing poverty and governance issues so that they can join his cause,” stated Aksar.
The group is the newest of a number of jihadist organizations within the Sahel area, together with the Defenders of Islam group linked to militant Iyad Ag Ghali in northern Mali. The motion for the Liberation of Macina, led by Hamadoun Koufa, remained very lively in central Mali.
Ansarul Islam, on the opposite aspect of the border, is growing its assaults in northern Burkina Faso, whereas Boko Haram continues to launch assaults within the nations in Africa’s Lake Chad Basin.
The al-Mourabitoun group, which is led by Moktar Belmokhtar — declared lifeless a number of occasions — has perpetrated a number of terror actions within the huge Sahel area, together with the 2013 assault on the In Amenas fuel plant in Algeria that left 67 individuals lifeless.
Assistant Secretary of Protection for Worldwide Safety Affairs Robert S. Karen, Marine Gen. Thomas D. Waldhauser, commander, U.S. Africa Command, and Military Maj. Gen. Roger L. Cloutier Jr., chief of employees, U.S. Africa Command, and lead investigating officer, temporary the media on the outcomes of the investigation of the Oct. four, 2017 ambush in Niger at Pentagon in Washington, D.C., Might 10, 2018. (DoD photograph by Navy Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Kathryn E. Holm)
OCT 2017 NIGER AMBUSH SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION 10 Might 2018
1. The findings and proposals with regard to the tragic occasions of four October 2017, that resulted within the deaths of 4 American and 4 Nigerien Troopers, are based mostly on all out there proof in regards to the actions and selections by the members of a U.S. Special Operations Forces workforce (USSOF Team), associate Nigerien forces, and better headquarters personnel throughout lively fight close to Tongo Tongo, Niger. The investigation report, ready by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), explains how Sergeant First Class (SFC) Jeremiah Johnson1, Employees Sergeant (SSG) Bryan Black, SSG Dustin Wright, and Sergeant (SGT) LaDavid Johnson gave their final full measure of devotion to our nation and died with honor whereas actively partaking the enemy. The investigation report additionally exhibits how Nigerien and French models assisted with out hesitation to help the troops in touch and really probably saved the lives of U.S. and Nigerien Troopers, a number of of whom have been wounded within the assault. The investigation workforce examined documentary, photographic, audio, video, and testimonial proof to make findings of reality. It interviewed 143 witnesses, together with survivors of the assault, one of whom accompanied the group again to the battlefield to elucidate what occurred through the four October 2017 incident.
2. This investigation identifies particular person, organizational, and institutional failures and deficiencies that contributed to the tragic occasions of four October 2017. Though the report particulars the compounding influence of tactical and operational selections, no single failure or deficiency was the only cause for the occasions of four October 2017. To the extent this report highlights tactical selections made by Troopers within the warmth of battle, it shouldn’t be ignored that American and Nigerien forces fought courageously on four October 2017 regardless of being considerably outnumbered by the enemy.
three. Based mostly on in depth assessment and evaluation of all related info, the investigating officer made the next findings:
a. On the request of the Authorities of Niger, U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) in Niger conduct a spread of counterterrorism and safety drive help actions with the Nigerien army to construct the capability of these forces to conduct operations to counter Boko Haram, Al Qaeda within the Islamic Maghreb, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria – Higher Sahara (ISIS-GS).
c. The USSOF Team concerned within the assault on four October 2017 beforehand deployed to Maradi, Niger in 2016. Team members knew once they returned from that deployment they might return to Niger one yr later. From November 2016 to August 2017, the USSOF Team targeted their coaching plan and deployment preparation on the anticipated return to Niger within the fall of 2017. Personnel turnover throughout that yr, nevertheless, prevented the USSOF Team from conducting key pre-deployment collective coaching as an entire group. Once they arrived in Ouallam, solely half of the workforce had carried out any collective coaching collectively.
d. Within the first three weeks they have been in Ouallam,theUSSOF Team (hereafter known as Team OUALLAM) concentrated totally on coaching the brand new CT Firm. Prior to three October 2017, Team OUALLAM carried out two partnered operations with different Nigerien forces.
E. On three October 2017, Team OUALLAM left Camp Ouallam with Nigerien forces on a CT operation within the neighborhood of Tiloa, Niger concentrating on a key member of ISIS-GS. Earlier than departing, Team OUALLAM didn’t conduct pre-mission rehearsals or battle drills with their companion pressure. As soon as in Tiloa, the aspect was unable to find the goal, so Team OUALLAM and their associate Nigeriens continued to a army camp close to Tiloa and carried out a key chief engagement (KLE) with a companion pressure commander. Though USSOF have the authority to conduct CT operations with associate Nigerien forces, the preliminary idea of operations (CONOPS) submitted for this mission was not authorised on the correct degree of command. Fairly, the USSOF Team commander and the subsequent greater degree commander on the Superior Operations Base (AOB), the company-level command, inaccurately characterised the character of the mission within the CONOPS. The AOB commander then accepted the CONOPS based mostly upon an incorrect perception that he had the authority to take action. On the time of Team OUALLAM’s departure on the preliminary mission, no command larger than the AOB was conscious that the mission sought to seek out/repair and, if attainable, seize a key member of ISIS-GS. The appearing AOB commander (a captain) was probably the most senior officer conscious of the true nature of the mission. Correct characterization of the mission would have required approval by the Special Operations Command and Management Aspect (SOCCE) commander, the battalion-level command, in N’Djamena, Chad.
f. Although the SOCCE commander was unaware of the true nature of Team OUALLAM’s unique mission, the AOB briefed the SOCCE commander on the brand new intelligence. The SOCCE commander then directed a multi-team raid together with a second USSOF Team and their associate Nigerien pressure out of Arlit, Niger as the primary effort, and Team OUALLAM and their companion Nigerien pressure because the supporting effort. Climate pressured the second USSOF Team to abort the air assault and the SOCCE commander subsequently ordered Team OUALLAM to execute the mission. The mission was unsuccessful in capturing the goal. Some media reviews alleged Team OUALLAM crossed the border into Mali in pursuit of terrorists. These reviews are false. The SOCCE commander’s approval of this mission was inside his authority and he remained in communication together with his greater headquarters. Following the raid, Team OUALLAM started their motion again to their house base.
g. Whereas returning tobase,Team OUALLAM’s associate Nigerien forces wanted water so the convoy stopped close to the village of Tongo Tongo to resupply. Whereas there, the Team OUALLAM commander carried out an impromptu KLE with village leaders. On the completion of the KLE, they departed the village and, at 1140 on four October 2017, Team OUALLAM and their companion Nigeriens have been ambushed instantly south of Tongo Tongo by a big enemy drive. The American and Nigerien Troopers dismounted and returned hearth. The Team OUALLAM commander, the Nigerien pressure commander, and a number of other Nigerien Troopers tried to counter assault the enemy in a flanking maneuver, killing roughly 4 enemy personnel. Quickly after, the enemy massed and commenced to envelop Team OUALLAM. Realizing then that the staff was considerably outnumbered by a well-trained pressure, the Team OUALLAM commander returned to the automobiles and ordered everybody to interrupt contact and withdraw to the south. Team members yelled to SSG J. Johnson, who acknowledged the order to withdraw by giving a thumbs up. Team members threw canisters of smoke to masks their motion and, beneath growing enemy hearth, the convoy started to withdraw. Two Nigerien automobiles and one U.S. car, together with three U.S. Troopers (SSG Black, SSG Wright, and SSG J. Johnson) didn’t withdraw from the preliminary ambush website. They have been final seen by workforce members actively partaking the enemy from defensive positions close to their car and getting ready to withdraw with the remaining of the group.
h. After the lead two automobiles started shifting they misplaced visible contact with the third car. SSG Wright entered the third car and commenced driving it slowly south whereas SSG J. Johnson and SSG Black moved subsequent to the car utilizing it as cowl whereas offering suppressive hearth. Through the motion, enemy small arms hearth hit SSG Black killing him immediately. SSG Wright halted the car and dismounted. Regardless of growing enemy hearth, each SSG Wright and SSG J. Johnson remained with SSG Black and tried to offer cowl and assess his wounds. Overrun by enemy fighters, SSG Wright and SSG J. Johnson have been pressured to evade on foot. Roughly 85 meters from the car, enemy small arms hearth hit SSG J. Johnson, severely wounding him. SSG Wright stopped, returned to SSG J. Johnson, and continued to interact the enemy till every was shot and killed by small arms hearth. SSG Black, SSG Wright, and SSG J. Johnson have been by no means captured alive by the enemy. As enemy fighters superior via the ambush website, they fired a number of further bursts into the our bodies of the three Troopers.
i. The entrance two U.S. automobiles and three associate automobiles moved roughly 700 meters south and consolidated at what the investigating staff calls “Position Two.” Realizing that the third car and their related personnel weren’t current, and after repeated makes an attempt to contact them, 4 U.S. Troopers moved on foot again to the ambush website to seek out them. Four different members of Team OUALLAM and roughly 25 companion Nigeriens remaining at Place Two continued to interact advancing enemy forces. The enemy pressed their assault with mounted and dismounted forces and commenced to envelop the remaining Troopers from the east and from the south. The remaining Team OUALLAM members at Place Two have been pressured to evade beneath enemy hearth. Previous to leaving Place Two, all workforce members acknowledged the order to interrupt contact. U.S. and Nigerien Troopers noticed SGT L. Johnson operating to his car. One car carrying three members of Team OUALLAM and 4 further companion Nigeriens accelerated away from Place Two beneath heavy hearth. Two U.S. Troopers and three companion Nigeriens have been wounded because the car evaded enemy fighters. One associate Nigerien was killed. The Troopers on this car have been unaware that the staff had turn into separated as they broke contact with the enemy.
j. SGT L. Johnson was in a susceptible place to the rear of his car when the order to interrupt contact was given. SGT L. Johnson acknowledged the order and, as the driving force of his car, he and two companion Nigeriens tried to get into his car and comply with. SGT L. Johnson and the 2 Nigerien Troopers have been unable to get into the car and have been pushed again to their susceptible positions by heavy enemy hearth. Unable to succeed in the car and with enemy forces quickly closing on their place, they have been pressured to evade on foot. Operating in a westerly path, the primary Nigerien Soldier was shot and killed roughly 460 meters from Place Two. The second Nigerien Soldier was shot and killed roughly 110 meters additional to the west. SGT L. Johnson continued to evade, operating west for a further 450 meters earlier than ultimately in search of cowl beneath a thorny tree roughly 960 meters from Place Two. There, SGT L. Johnson continued to return hearth towards the pursuing enemy. The enemy suppressed SGT L. Johnson with a vehicle-mounted heavy machine gun. Dismounted enemy then maneuvered on SGT L. Johnson killing him with small arms hearth. The enemy didn’t seize SGT L. Johnson alive. SGT L. Johnson’s arms weren’t sure and he was not executed however was killed in motion whereas actively partaking the enemy.
okay. Beneath heavy hearth from pursuing enemy automobiles and dismounted personnel, the primary car continued north at a excessive price of velocity turning into caught in a swampy space southwest of the unique ambush website. With enemy hearth growing and turning into simpler, all personnel dismounted from the car. The driving force referred to as over the radio indicating they have been about to be overrun. The radio name occurred 53 minutes after first contact and was Team OUALLAM’s first request for help since first reporting “Troops in Contact.” The remaining U.S. and Nigerien personnel dismounted and commenced shifting west.
Four Special Forces Members Killed in Niger
l. The 4 U.S. Troopers who had returned to the ambush website killed a number of enemy troopers close to the unique ambush website however have been unable to find the car or SSG Black, SSG Wright, and SSG J. Johnson. Underneath heavy hearth, they rejoined the remaining of the group dismounting from the car caught within the swamp. It was at this level they realized SGT L. Johnson was not current. The enemy forces started partaking them with heavy hearth forcing them to withdraw. The workforce members offered crucial medical care to the wounded, and evaded to a wooded space west of the ambush website. The mixed group established a last defensive place, the place they ready to make their final stand.
m. Upon receipt of the preliminary report of troops in touch, the AOB alerted Nigerien forces whereas the SOCCE alerted the French by way of their liaison officer. Each companions responded instantly. Nigerien floor forces departed eight minutes after notification and arrived in Tongo Tongo roughly four hours and 25 minutes later resulting from distance, lack of roads, and tough terrain. French Mirage plane carried out the primary present of drive roughly 47 minutes after receiving notification. A single Nigerien helicopter took off roughly 40 minutes after receiving the request. The helicopter diverted previous to arrival in Tongo Tongo so as to de-conflict airspace for French jets. Regardless of being armed, the French plane have been unable to interact as a result of they might not determine U.S. troop places and didn’t have communications with the group on the bottom. As an alternative, they flew at low altitude in 4 separate exhibits of pressure that brought about the enemy to retreat for canopy, possible saving the lives of the surviving members of the USSOF Team. At roughly 1715, French forces from Process Drive (TF) BARKHANE arrived in two helicopters and evacuated the surviving Troopers.
n. A Nigerien floor fast response drive situated the stays of SSGWright,SSG Black, SSG J. Johnson, and one Nigerien Soldier as they swept by way of the ambush website. At roughly 1900 on four October 2017, the Nigeriens transferred the stays of the three American Troopers to U.S. custody. Further U.S. and Nigerien floor forces remained within the Tongo Tongo space looking for SGT L. Johnson till roughly 0540 hours on the morning of the fifth earlier than returning to base to refit and proceed search and restoration operations.
o. At 0320 on 5October 2017, the Commander, AFRICOM deployed his theater Disaster Response Pressure and referred to as for the mobilization of nationally-controlled belongings educated and devoted for personnel restoration (PR) missions. U.S. and partnered Nigerien forces continued to seek for SGT L. Johnson utilizing numerous surveillance platforms all through durations of darkness after which utilizing floor forces once more starting at first mild.
p.On the morning of 6 October2017, Nigerien forces recovered SGTL.Johnson’s stays roughly 960 meters from Place Two and roughly 1.6 km from the unique ambush website. The Tongo Tongo village elder first notified after which led Nigerien forces to the situation of SGT L. Johnson’s stays. When discovered, SGT L. Johnson’s palms weren’t sure and he was laying on his again together with his arms to his sides. At 1522 on 6 October 2017, the Nigeriens transferred the stays of SGT L. Johnson to U.S. custody.
q.The investigation decided SSGJeremiah Johnson, SSGBryan Black, SSG Dustin Wright, and SGT LaDavid Johnson have been killed by small arms hearth whereas actively partaking the enemy. At no level have been U.S. forces captured alive.
r. In the course of the restoration efforts there have been many preliminary reviews that U.S. methods detected alerts from gear assigned to Team OUALLAM. These studies proved false. U.S. techniques didn’t detect any alerts from any units or Personnel Restoration gear assigned to Team OUALLAM through the Troops in Contact occasion close to Tongo Tongo.
s. All 4 Troopers killed in motion sustained wounds that have been both instantly deadly or quickly deadly, and have been deceased by the point the preliminary website was accessible to personnel restoration belongings. All 4 Troopers have been killed in motion earlier than French and Nigerien responding forces arrived in Tongo Tongo. Each Troopers wounded in motion sustained accidents that have been managed expeditiously by Team members.
t. SGT L. Johnson evaded on foot to a location outdoors the instant search space of responding forces leading to a 48-hour delay find his stays. Efforts to find SGT L. Johnson have been initially delayed by errant reporting that SGT L. Johnson was being held in a village north of Tongo Tongo close to the Mali border. U.S. forces targeted restoration efforts finding SGT L. Johnson, whereas concurrently mobilizing further belongings to conduct a specialised personnel restoration operation.
u. Whereas there’s proof to point that the enemy enjoys freedom of motion in Tongo Tongo, there’s not sufficient proof to conclude that the villagers of Tongo Tongo willingly (with out duress) help and help them. Moreover, there’s inadequate proof to find out if villagers aided the enemy or participated within the assault.
v. Contradictory and ambiguous CONOPS approval matrices between Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA), Special Operations Command Ahead- North and West Africa, SOCCE, and the AOB resulted in confusion relating to the right approval degree for sure varieties of CONOPS. A reliance on templated CONOPS (minimize and paste from earlier CONOPS), a scarcity of consideration to element in high quality management and high quality assurance, and insufficient notification of CONOPS to SOCAFRICA all contributed to a common lack of situational consciousness and command oversight at each echelon. The CONOPS improvement, evaluation, approval, and notification processes have been pro-forma and didn’t mirror the detailed, deliberate planning and oversight instruments they’re meant to be.
w. The quick response by French and Nigerien companion forces saved American lives. Exhibits of drive by French plane prevented surviving members of the staff from being overrun, and brought on the enemy to interrupt off their pursuit and flee the world. Nigerien floor forces performed an important position in securing the world and aiding within the restoration efforts.
x. Particular person members of the USSOF Team carried out quite a few acts of bravery whereas underneath hearth on four October 2017 and their actions ought to be reviewed for applicable recognition.
1 SFC Jeremiah Johnson was promoted posthumously to the rank of Sergeant First Class. To keep away from confusion, all through this report SFC Johnson is known as Employees Sergeant (SSG) Johnson, as that was his rank on the time of the assault and all witnesses referred to him as SSG Johnson.
SecDef to Media: Put A Lid On It: Four Special Forces Members Killed in Niger
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